Στρατεύματα συγκεντρώνονται στα ανατολικά, βορειοδυτικά και δυτικά προάστια της πρωτεύουσας, αναφέρει το Αμερικανικό Ινστιτούτο Μελετών Πολέμου (ISW) και σημειώνει: «Οι Ρώσοι ενισχύουν τις δυνάμεις τους, κλιμακώνοντας παράλληλα τους βομβαρδισμούς προκειμένου να αποδυναμώσουν την άμυνα και να εκφοβίσουν τους αμυνόμενους πριν εξαπολύσουν μια τέτοια επίθεση».
Σύμφωνα με την ανάλυση, η επιχείρηση θα μπορούσε να αποτελέσει κομβικό σημείο στη ρωσική εισβολή, καθώς δεν είναι καθόλου βέβαιο εάν θα στεφόταν με επιτυχία ενδεχόμενη απόπειρα κατάληψης της πόλης.
«Εάν τα ρωσικά στρατεύματα καταφέρουν να ανεφοδιαστούν, να αναδιοργανωθούν και να σχεδιάσουν συντονισμένες επιχειρήσεις γύρω και προς την πρωτεύουσα, μπορεί να έχουν μεγαλύτερη επιτυχία σε σχέση με προηγούμενες επιχειρήσεις».
Συγκεκριμένα όπως αναφέρει το Αμερικανικό Ινστιτούτο Μελετών Πολέμου (ISW) οι ρωσικές δυνάμεις ετοιμάζονται να επιτεθούν στο Κίεβο τις επόμενες ημέρες. Το αμερικανικό στρατιωτικό thinktank που παρακολουθεί στενά τις εξελίξεις στην Ουκρανία πιστεύει ότι «οι ρωσικές δυνάμεις συγκεντρώνονται στα ανατολικά, βορειοδυτικά και δυτικά προάστια του Κιέβου για μια επίθεση στην πρωτεύουσα τις επόμενες 24-96 ώρες».
Οι ρωσικές δυνάμεις, που μαστίζονται από προβλήματα υλικοτεχνικής υποστήριξης, δεν προχώρησαν σχεδόν καθόλου πρόσφατα, αλλά το ISW έγραψε στην ανάλυση που δημοσιεύθηκε χθες ότι «αναφέρουν προμήθειες και ενισχύσεις καθώς και πραγματοποιούν επιθέσεις πυροβολικού, αέρος και πυραύλων για να αποδυναμώσουν την άμυνα και να εκφοβίσουν τους υπερασπιστές πριν από μια τέτοια επίθεση».
Διαβάστε παρακάτω αυτούσια την έκθεση του ISW:
Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 7
Fredrick W. Kagan, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko
March 7, 3:00 PM EST
1. Russian forces are concentrating in the eastern, northwestern, and western outskirts of
Kyiv for an assault on the capital in the coming 24–96 hours. The Russians are bringing
up supplies and reinforcements as well as conducting artillery, air, and missile attacks
to weaken defenses and intimidate defenders in advance of such an assault. It is too soon
to gauge the likely effectiveness of any Russian attempt to complete the encirclement of Kyiv or to
seize the city at this time. If Russian troops have been able to resupply, reorganize, and plan
deliberate and coordinated simultaneous operations along the several axes of advance around and
into the capital, they may be more successful in this operation than they have in previous
undertakings. Operations near Kyiv in the past 72 hours have not offered enough evidence to evaluate
that likelihood.
Russian troops in southern Ukraine continue to divide their efforts between attacks westward toward
Mykolayiv and Odesa, attacks northward toward Zaporizhya, and attacks eastward toward Mariupol
and Donbas. Failure to focus on any single line of advance has likely hindered Russian operations and
will probably continue to do so. Russian troops in Kherson Oblast appear to be feeling their way
around Mykolayiv, likely seeking to find a route across the Southern Bug River that would allow them
to bypass Mykolayiv itself and resume their advance on Odesa. Those heading toward Zaporizhya
currently lack the combat power likely necessary to encircle or take that large city. They could,
however, set conditions for successful operations against Zaporizhya once reinforcements arrive
following the fall of Mariupol and the opening of a wide land route westward from Donbas.
Key Takeaways
• Russian forces are consolidating and preparing for further operations along the
western and eastern outskirts of Kyiv, especially in the Irpin area on the west and
the Brovary area on the east;
• Ukrainian forces are challenging the extended Russian lines reaching from Sumy,
which Russian forces have not yet taken, to the eastern outskirts of Kyiv;
• Russian troops are likely attempting to bypass Mykolayiv and cross the Southern
Bug upriver of that city to permit an advance on Odesa that will combine with an
impending amphibious operation against that city; and
• Russian forces are driving north from Crimea toward the city of Zaporizhya.
Russian forces are engaged in four primary efforts at this time:
• Main effort—Kyiv (comprised of three subordinate supporting efforts);
• Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv;
o Supporting effort 1a—Luhansk Oblast;
• Supporting effort 2—Mariupol; and
• Supporting effort 3—Kherson and advances westward.
2. Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
3. Main effort—Kyiv axis: Russian operations on the Kyiv axis consist of a main effort
aimed at encircling the city from the northwest, west, east.
Russian forces are likely completing preparations for an assault to seize Kyiv from the
east and west within the next 24–96 hours. The Russians are setting conditions for the
attack by concentrating supplies and reinforcements, attempting to advance and
stabilize their lines, and attacking the city with air, artillery, and missile fire likely
intended both to demoralize and to damage Kyiv’s defenders. The Ukrainian General Staff
reported on March 6 that the Russians have started accumulating the resources they would need to
storm the capital.1 The General Staff noted that Ukrainian forces retain a coherent defense of the city
at this time.2
Subordinate main effort along the west bank of the Dnipro
Russian forces have continued their efforts to secure control of the town of Irpin, approximately 20
kilometers west–northwest of the center of Kyiv, as well as the town of Bucha, about 4 kilometers
north of Irpin, in the last 24 hours.3 The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 6 that Russian
tank and motorized infantry columns are operating in the Irpin area.4 Social media reports and
reports from the ground support this assessment.5 The Russians are reportedly using a siege–and–
starve approach in Irpin similar to activities they conducted in Syria in order to compel Irpin to
surrender. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 7 that the Russians have denied the
inhabitants of Irpin water, heating, and food supplies for three days and are not allowing them to
leave.6 Social media users reported damage from Russian rocket attacks on civilian infrastructure in
Irpin on March 7.7 The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian elements under the
command of Chechen leader Ramazan Kadyrov were shelling civilian targets on March 7 in the town
of Myla, roughly 7.5 kilometers southwest of Irpin.8 These reports are all consistent with previously–
observed Russian efforts to consolidate control of this critical area to facilitate further advances south
and southeast to encircle Kyiv and/or to launch attacks directly against central Kyiv itself. Continued
Russian fighting and shelling in this area in the last 24 hours could indicate that conditions are not yet
set on the northwestern axis for Russian forces to launch the ground attack directly against Kyiv
within the next 24 hours, but ISW does not have sufficient evidence to rule out the possibility that
they might do so.
Subordinate supporting effort — Chernihiv axis
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 7 that Russian forces are concentrating elements of
the 41st Combined Arms Army near the southern outskirts of Chernihiv and intend to encircle and
presumably seize the town.9 It had previously reported its assessment that Russian troops intend to
seize Chernihiv city on March 6.10 Social media reports from March 6 of Russian weapons systems
near Chernihiv may support this assessment.11 Major Russian combat operations against Chernihiv
city have not been reported as of this publication.
Subordinate supporting effort — Sumy axis
Russian troops are establishing themselves in Kyiv’s eastern outskirts as of March 7. The Ukrainian
General Staff reported a successful March 6 attack against a Russian weapons depot in Nova Basan,
roughly 70 kilometers east–northeast of Kyiv’s center.12 That depot was likely supporting Russian
operations reported in our previous updates on the axis from Brovary toward Boryspil airport. Social
media reports of Russian multiple–launch rocket system (MLRS) units firing on Kyiv from the vicinity
of Peremoha, near Brovary and about 23 kilometers from central Kyiv, support assessments that
Russian troops are conducting fire attacks to set conditions for further ground operations in the
eastern Kyiv outskirts.
4 Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces in and around Brovary likely came from the Sumy
axis and continue to be supported along the roads stretching east through Sumy to Russia. The
Russians face challenges sustaining such a long logistics line, particularly since they have not yet
captured Sumy itself and Ukrainian forces continue to conduct attacks along the route. The Ukrainian
General Staff assessed on March 6 that Russian forces are focused on encircling Sumy (and other
cities).13 It reported on March 7 that Russian troops are preparing to attack Sumy.14 It noted on March
7 that Russian forces near Okhtyrka, about 68 kilometers south of Sumy and 100 kilometers west–
northwest of Kharkiv, had taken 50 percent losses and had to regroup and resupply.15 The Ukrainian
General Staff offered the same assessment of Russian forces in Konotop, roughly 120 kilometers west–
northwest of Sumy. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported a March 6 attack on a Russian weapons
depot near Skrypali, about 81 kilometers west of Sumy along the road via Priluky and Brovary to
Kyiv.16 These continued Ukrainian attacks against Russian logistical positions along this extended line
of advance may delay or disrupt Russian efforts to launch a ground offensive against Kyiv itself from
the east.
The Russians have reportedly not yet secured the entire stretch of a critical road along this axis,
moreover, as social media reports indicate that Ukrainian forces still control the important town of
Romny and Ukrainian media notes that the town of Lebedyn is also still under Ukrainian control.17
The Russians may feel it necessary to finish securing their ground lines of communication to eastern
Kyiv before attempting to take the capital. If they do not do so, they risk disruptions and challenges
during the climactic battle of the campaign.
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv:
Russian forces have continued to attack Kharkiv by air and ground fires but have not
renewed a ground offensive attack on the city. The Ukrainian General Staff assesses
that the Russians will attempt to encircle Kharkiv, but ISW has observed no indicators
of imminent Russian operations along those lines. Numerous social media reports from
March 6 and 7 show the effects of Russian bombardments in and around Kharkiv, indicating that
Russian attacks are indiscriminate.18 Ukrainian forces continue to report on losses they have inflicted
on Russian troops, especially senior officers killed in the fighting.19
Supporting Effort #1a—Luhansk Oblast:
Social media reports indicate that Ukrainian forces conducted a counterattack on March 6 against
Russian forces operating near Severodonetsk, as well as on an explosion and fire at an oil depot in
Luhansk.20 Russian forces do not appear to have made significant gains on this axis in the past 24
hours.
Supporting Effort #2—Mariupol:
Russian forces continued their encirclement of Mariupol and have increased efforts to break into the
city as well as to drive on Volnovakha, roughly 56 kilometers north of Mariupol, from the east and the
west. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on indecisive fighting roughly 50 kilometers west of
Volnovakha around Lubymivka, which the Russians reportedly hold.21 The Ukrainian General Staff
report suggests that Russian efforts to reach Volnovakha from the east are having more success,
although they have not yet succeeded.22 Russian troops also attempted to enter the neighborhood of
Staryi Krim, northwest of Mariupol, on March 7, but were repulsed according to the Ukrainian
General Staff. Social media posts testify to the intensity of combat in and around Mariupol.23
5 Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Supporting Effort #3—Kherson and west:
Russian forces operating north of Crimea appear to continue to divide their efforts into penny–packets
along multiple axes of advance. The Ukrainian General Staff reports that of the 17 battalion tactical
groups (BTGs) operating in the vicinity of Kherson two are focused on Mykolayiv, two are driving up
the Southern Bug toward Vosnesensk, one is allocated to an advance on Odesa at some point (but has
not likely begun that advance), four are operating northward toward Zaporizhya, and three are
supporting the Mariupol effort.24 Social media reports showed Russian armored vehicles moving
through Heniches’k, likely toward either Mariupol or Melitopol, on March 6.25 Roughly 49 Russian
helicopters were spotted at Kherson Airbase on March 6.26
Russian forces appear to be prioritizing operations north from Crimea toward Zaporizhya City itself.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 7 that Russian troops are restoring the airfield at
Melitopol, roughly 110 kilometers south of Zaporizhya.27 Its previous report had identified three
Russian BTGs advancing north toward Zaporizhya.28 Zaporizhya is a large city of nearly three–
quarters of a million people. Russian troops are unlikely to be able to encircle or seize it with an attack
on this scale if Ukrainians defend it as they have defended other threatened cities.
Russian troops are conducting intense shelling of Mykolayiv and nearby towns, likely to prepare for a
ground assault on the city.29 The Ukrainian General Staff reported that a Russian BTG crossed the
Inhul River at Kashpero–Mykolaivka, roughly 50 kilometers north of Mykolayiv, on March 6.30 This
movement is consistent with expected Russian efforts to reach crossings of the Southern Bug north of
Mykolayiv, as a fight to seize Mykolayiv and its bridge would likely delay the prepared Russian attack
on Odesa for longer than the Russian General Staff would prefer.
Immediate items to watch
• Russian forces may launch an attempt to encircle Kyiv from east and west and/or to seize the
city center itself within the next 24–96 hours;
• Russian troops may drive on Zaporizhya city itself within the next 48–72 hours, likely
attempting to block it from the east and set conditions for subsequent operations after Russian
forces besieging Mariupol take that city;
• Russian forces may attempt amphibious landings anywhere along the Black Sea Coast from
Odesa to the mouth of the Southern Bug in the next 24–48 hours.
1 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/266469205666165
2 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/267024028944016
3 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/266469205666165
4 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/266469205666165
5 https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1500812183780970500
6 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/266624555650630
7 https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1500765060507049989
8 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/267024028944016
9 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/266840212295731
10 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/266469205666165
11 https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1500363384511946752;
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1500363896305106946;
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1500753000561840131
12 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/266469205666165
13 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/266469205666165
14 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/266840212295731
15 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/267024028944016
16 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/266469205666165
6 Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
17 https://apostroph dot ua/news/society/2022–03–07/v–sumskoy–oblasti–vsu–razgromili–kolonnu–okkupantov–zatrofeili–
pyat–tankov–samohodku–i–uragan/261714, https://twitter.com/sumyurban/status/1500516058289127436
18 https://twitter.com/Den_2042/status/1500814876532486149, https://twitter.com/Liveuamap/status/1500725094640984064,
https://twitter.com/ignis_fatum/status/1500692805341138948;
https://twitter.com/bradyafr/status/1500605911701893121;
https://twitter.com/YWNReporter/status/1500594809735684097;
https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1500596325963997194
19 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/266469205666165
20 https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1500555922829103104;
https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1500555308455936000;
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1500582661194235910
, https://twitter.com/TheInsiderPaper/status/1500689985560891396;
https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1500688992739774467;
https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1500698991427739648
21 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/266840212295731
22 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/266840212295731
23 https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1500726640636317697;
https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1500829731608051714/photo/4;
https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1500830095963049985;
https://twitter.com/Caucasuswar/status/1500559614273892354;
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1500818583512879110
24 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/266840212295731
25 https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1500502033526370304
26 https://twitter.com/konrad_muzyka/status/1500876567509147650
27 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/266840212295731
28 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/266469205666165
29 https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1500804490106179589;
https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1500802025780662278;
https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1500692307976273921;
https://twitter.com/CITeam_ru/status/1500846253969743882, https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1500692819362594817,
https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1500693456317992969, https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1500730076115132422
30 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/266469205666165
Αυτό θα μπορούσε να προαναγγέλλει την έναρξη μιας κρίσιμης στιγμής στον πόλεμο, γράφουν οι αναλυτές στην τελευταία τους καθημερινή επισκόπηση. Είναι πολύ νωρίς για να μετρήσουμε την πιθανή αποτελεσματικότητα οποιασδήποτε ρωσικής προσπάθειας να ολοκληρώσει την περικύκλωση του Κιέβου ή να καταλάβει την πόλη αυτή τη στιγμή, αναφέρεται χαρακτηριστικά στην ανάλυση.
Εάν τα ρωσικά στρατεύματα μπόρεσαν να ανεφοδιάσουν, να αναδιοργανώσουν και να σχεδιάσουν σκόπιμες και συντονισμένες ταυτόχρονες επιχειρήσεις κατά μήκος των διαφόρων αξόνων προέλασης γύρω και προς την πρωτεύουσα, μπορεί να είναι πιο επιτυχημένα σε αυτή την επιχείρηση από ό,τι σε προηγούμενες επιχειρήσεις.
Τα ρωσικά στρατεύματα στη νότια Ουκρανία συνεχίζουν να μοιράζουν τις προσπάθειές τους μεταξύ επιθέσεων προς τα δυτικά προς το Μικολάγιεβ και την Οδησσό, τις επιθέσεις βόρεια προς τη Ζαπορίζια και τις επιθέσεις προς τα ανατολικά προς τη Μαριούπολη και το Ντονμπάς. Η αποτυχία εστίασης σε οποιαδήποτε γραμμή προέλασης πιθανότατα παρεμπόδισε τις ρωσικές επιχειρήσεις και πιθανότατα θα συνεχίσει να το κάνει. Τα ρωσικά στρατεύματα στην περιφέρεια της Χερσώνας φαίνεται να αισθάνονται το δρόμο τους γύρω από το Μικολάιβ, πιθανότατα αναζητώντας μια διαδρομή στον ποταμό Southern Bug που θα τους επέτρεπε να παρακάμψουν το ίδιο το Μικολάγιεβ και να συνεχίσουν την προέλασή τους στην Οδησσό. Όσοι κατευθύνονται προς τη Ζαπορίζια δεν έχουν αυτήν τη στιγμή την μαχητική ισχύ που είναι πιθανώς απαραίτητη για να περικυκλώσουν ή να καταλάβουν αυτή τη μεγάλη πόλη. Θα μπορούσαν, ωστόσο, να θέσουν όρους για επιτυχημένες επιχειρήσεις εναντίον της Ζαπορίζια μόλις φτάσουν οι ενισχύσεις μετά την πτώση της Μαριούπολης και το άνοιγμα μιας ευρείας χερσαίας οδού προς τα δυτικά από το Ντονμπάς.
Βασικά key points
- Οι ρωσικές δυνάμεις ενοποιούνται και προετοιμάζονται για περαιτέρω επιχειρήσεις κατά μήκος των δυτικών και ανατολικών προαστίων του Κιέβου, ιδιαίτερα στην περιοχή Irpin στα δυτικά και στην περιοχή Brovary στα ανατολικά.
- Οι ουκρανικές δυνάμεις αμφισβητούν τις εκτεταμένες ρωσικές γραμμές που φτάνουν από το Σούμι, τις οποίες οι ρωσικές δυνάμεις δεν έχουν ακόμη κατακτήσει, στα ανατολικά προάστια του Κιέβου.
- Τα ρωσικά στρατεύματα πιθανότατα επιχειρούν να παρακάμψουν το Μικολάγιεβ και να διασχίσουν τον ποταμό Southern Bug αυτής της πόλης για να επιτρέψουν μια προέλαση στην Οδησσό που θα συνδυαστεί με μια επικείμενη αμφίβια επιχείρηση εναντίον αυτής της πόλης.
